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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with the problem of becoming a 
self as it is presented in the philosophies of S~ren 
Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nie tzsche . Specifically it is 
cone erned with the role which power plays in the develop •-
ment of the self. Since becoming a self invo lves motiva-
tion the problem is viewed in terms of Dietrich Von 
Hildebrand's categories of importance and their role in 
motivation. 
The categ ories 01~ importance are presented as the 
basic viewpoint t~rom which the ti.rn philosophers are 
studied. This is followed by a presentation of basic no-
tions of the self as they appear in ~he writing of 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Within this background the 
specific question of the role of power is investigated, 
first generally and then specifically as it applies to 
each philosopher. Next the self is viewed in terms of 
J 
immanence and. transcendence. Finally, with these con-
cepts in mind, each philosopher's notion of the self is 
analyzed in depth. 
After studying these two philosophers and their 
ideas on the role of power in becoming a self several 
things become clear. Although both Nietzsche and Kierke-
gaard are cal .led tha forerunners ot' exist e ntialism there 
/ 
is a great d e a~ of dif fere nce b 0tw e en t he ~ wo in -their 
respective philosophies of man. Nietzsche claims to be 
against the development of a "t y pe" of man and ·is regarded 
as a proponent of individuality. Yet will to power as an v 
immanent dri v e lead s one to the impersonality of fatalism. 
There :fore there is no true individuality, nor true self in 
Nietzsche's philosophy because he denies that relationship 
to another is essential to the self. Kierkegaard, 1vho 
states that the proper relationship to God is absolutely 
necessary if ' one is to become a self, emerges as the true 
advocate of individuality. This is not the totally in-
dependent individuality which is often associated with 
existentialism but rather individuality which co me :=; r~r om 
being gr n und e d in a gr e ater Powe r. 
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PRESENTATION OF THE CATEGORIES OF IMPORTANCE 
This paper wishes to examine the notion of the self 
which is present in the philosophies of Spren Kierkegaard 
and Friedrich Nietzsche. Of special interest will be the 
role of power in the process of becoming a self. The no-
tion of power is central to Nietzsche's philosophy and 
his views on this point will be contrasted with Kierke-
gaard's. For Kierkegaard one does not become ·a self with-
out being related to God. This view introduces the ques-
tion of how a self is related to the Transcendent. First 
some basic ideas about the self and its possible motiva-
tions will be presented as a background against which to 
view the thoughts of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. 
The term II self'" is one which is used i.n a special 
sense by K:i_erkegaard · and his meaning cf it will b s-come 
claa.r (;;r a...fter his notions of despair and the overcoming of 
it have been put forth. For the present when speaking o :f 
possibilities of motivation I will use the term "person" 
and introduce the various philosophical distinctions re-
garding the self at a later time. 
Dietrich Von Hildebrand's "categories of importance" 




person is motivated. The firs ,:; c a te g ory is t ermed the 
subjectively satisfying. Here, the c riterion of a t hing's 
importance is whether it is impor t ant to s omeone. If a 
person is motivated, he i s moved by something, some th ing 
matters to him. Perhaps the most basic way someone ex-
periences this kind of motivation is by feeling a need 
which he wants t o satisfy. He is hungry or thirsty or 
lonely and seeks an object--food., drink, or companionship~-
to fill that need. The feeling of need is a feeling of 
lack in oneself and the ultimate object of need - fulfill- ✓ 
ment is oneself. Something outside of oneself may be 
used to fill the need, but it is because su~h an obj e ct is 
satisfying for oneself that one is mot ivated toward it. 
way. 
so ·me persons v ie w all object _s of mo t ivation in this 
If something is important for me then it is "good." 
The relationship to one's satisfaction is seen as the 
only source of importance the object has. However this 
is a narrow way of look~ng at things and disregards the 
fact that some things are important in themselves. Such 
things are said to have value. Value is the second cate-
gory of importance. 
One can be awestruck in the face of a beautiful sun-
rise or a waterfall, or moved to admiration by an heroic 
rescue by a fireman because such things are impor t ant in 
1cf. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, E th ics (Chica go: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), Chapt e r J, pp. J 4- 64. 
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themselves. A waterfa J_l is no t b e au tifu.l for anyone, it 
is just beautiful. Something which has value has value in 
itself. "The intrinsic importance with which a generous 
act of forgiveness i.s endowed is termed 'value' as dis-
tingu~shed from the importance of all those goods which 
motivate our interest merely because they are agreeable or 
satisfactory to us. 112 
Th.ere is a third category with which to characterize 
goods which motivate us. These are things which are ob-
jectively good for a person, such as health or freedom. 
These things are more than just subjectively satisfying ' 
and yet they are not independen t of a reia t ionship to a 
person as something which has value is. Tha t which is ob-
jec t ively good for someone is depend ent u pon value in that 
one cannot know what is objectively good for a p e rson with-
out f'irst knowing what things are good in themsel v;es. 
Without a recognition of value one will remain in the 
realm of the subjectively satisfying. In this paper we 
will be concerned with the differences between the sub-
jectively sa t isfying and value. 
Because the realms of t he subjec t ively sat~sfying 
and value are essen t ially different the response to each 
type of object of motivation will also be very different. 
In the area of the subjectively satisfying one responds 
2
Ibid., p. J.'5. 
4 
not to the object but to the need or desire in oneself 
which the object will satis-fy. One r~sponds to such an 
object not so much because it is good or important but 
because it is for oneself. On the other hand one responds 
to a value just because it is important. The value de-
mands that one respond to it appropriately because it is 
the value and not because it is related to oneself in any 
way. Response to value 
••• has the character of an abandoning of ourselves, 
a transcending of the boundaries of our self-centered-
ness, a submission of some sort. Interest in the sub-
jectively satisfying reveals on the contrary, a sel:t:,-
confinement, a relat~ng of the object to ourselves, 
using it for our own. self-centered satisfaction. J 
We have seen two ways in whi .ch a person may be 
motivated and so two ways in which he . may respond. In 
responding to the ~ubjectively satisfying one is self-
centered; in responding to value one transcends one's 
self-centeredness. In the next chapters we will see how 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard view the ideal man in rel~tion 
to these ideas. 
.39. 
II. NIETZSCHE'S WELL-TURNED-OUT MAN 
.In this chapter we will see Nietzsche's description 
of the person who has turned out well and we will see that 
this person is one who is a master in the art of the sub-
jectively satisfying. He is described as a man of soli-
tude whose strength insures that everything will turn out 
well. His formula for greatness is~ fati, loving 
one's fate. We will see that one of Nietzsche's main 
points is that selfishness is absolutely necessary if one 
is to become oneself. Nietzsche sees this well-turned-
out person or Overman a s the creator of his o-wn values, 
and ultimately he makes no distinction between the sub-
jectively satisfying and value. 
Master of the Subjectively Satisfying 
In Ecce Home Nietzsche's autobiography subtitled 
"How One Becomes What One Is, 11 he offers a picture of the 
com9lete man. 
What is it, fundamentally, that allows us to recognize, 
who has turned out well? That a well-turned-out person 
pleases our senses, that he is carved from wood that is 
hard, delicate, and at th e same time smells good. He 
has a caste only .for what is good for him; h:i.s pleasure, 
his deli .ght ceR.se where the measure of' w-11.at i~ g ood for 
him is tra nsgressed ••.• He is always in his own com-
pany whether he associates with books, human beings Or'. 
landscapes; he honors by choosing, by admitting, by 
trusting-. • He believes neither in I misfor+, 1.1ne 1 
5 
nor in I guil t 1 : hi=. comes t o tei 'ms wi th h i ms e l f' , ·with 
others, h e kno ws h ow t o f org et -- h e is st r on g enou gh , 
hence everything mus t t arn ou t for his bes t. 1 
6 
Tht:.:re are se v eral c en t ral idea s pre s ent in tb. i .s one quote. 
First, t here i s t he s t a t ement t ha t f or Nie t zsc h e a 
well-turned-out per s on i s one who is totally concerned 
with th e subjecti v ely satisf y ing. His concern with what 
is good for himself accounts for his succe s s. It is in-
teresting that Nietzsche's description, though applying 
ostensibly to the whole person, is given in sensuous terms. 
The per s on who has turned out well "pleases our senses,n 
"smells good," is '?carved from wood" and has a 11 taste 11 for 
what is g ood for him, the subjectivel y satisfying. The 
sensu ous e x peri enc e is a reflexi v e one. One i s concerned 
with t h e fee .ling within , ra t her t han with t he object which 
becomes only a t ool, something to be used to create or 
satisfy a certain feeling. Even in matters of relation-
ship, comin g to terms with oneself or others, only the 
subjectively satisf y ing motivates such a person; relation-
s.hips c1_re ordered by t h e ir importance to the in d ividual 
rather than b y a sense of the worth of onesel f a.1.1.d others 
as pers ons on a de eper level . 
As Von Hildebrand noted, the realm of the subjec:-
tively sa t is 1~ying j_s an imprisoning one. This is evi-
deuced by Ni etzsche's statement that a well-turned-out 
1Friedrich Nie t zsc h e, Ecce Homo in On t h e Gen e alo gy 
of Moral s/ ~ c c e Re mo, t r ans .~W a l ter Ka u fm;;;: ( New York: 
Vintage Boo ks, 1967) , p. 224 . 
7 
person is "always in his o,m comp any . 11 This is not the 
solitude of a person who separates himself from the crowd 
in order to concern himself with something deeper and more 
important but rather the solitude of one who fears conta-
mina~ion by others because it might upset his quest for 
what is "good" for him. Others are important only insofar 
as they can prove good or useful to the "successful" per-
soh. For on~ confined and isolated in this world, cut off 
from the realm of value, there is no mention of response 
to anything outside or above for its own sake • 
. Another central idea introduced here is the notion 
of strength. It seems that the well-turned-out person has 
such a strong sense of what is good for him that he suf-
fers no wrongs from without (misfortune) or within 
(guilt). It is because he is strong enough that every-
thing turns out for his best. Yet even this notion of 
strength is curiously narrow for it must be admitted that 
there are natural limits to physical and mental power. So 
if strength is able to insure that things turn out for the 
best perhaps it is because one has a limited view of what 
the best is. If the best is what is subjectively satis-
fying then it is conceivable that a certain amount of work 
2 and discipline could achieve this limited goal. 
2 cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. 
by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 19 68) , p. 267. 
"In so far as the word 'knowledge 1 has any meaning, the 
world is knowable; but it is interuretab .le otherwise, 




Nietzsche himself' tries to show that this notion of 
what is best is not narrow but the ultimate for man. 
My formula :for greatness in a h.uman being j_s ~ fati: 
that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, 
not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear 
what is necessary, still less conceal it--all idealism 
is mendaciou 3ness in the face of what is necessary-:-but love it. --- --
If one wants nothing to be different then in order to be 
true to oneself one must say that everything has turned 
out for the best. But there is a difference between a 
person who accepts and loves his fate because he sees only 
his o-wn strengths and limitations, and a person who loves 
his life in humility yet recognizes a power greater than 
himself capable of eff'ecting change. 
4 
Kierkegaard be-
lieves strongly that with God al.l ·things are possible, and 
so, one does want things to be different. Such a person 
is not one who complains about his past and present and 
dreams about his future, but rather one who accepts his 
life for what it is, yet lives full of hope. 
"It is our needs that interpret the world; our 
drives and their For and Against •. Every drive is a 
kind of lust - to rule; each one has its perspective that 
it would like to compell all the otbr drives to accept 
as a norm." 
If Nietzsche were to admit an objective world as it 
really is he would be admitting a weakness, a lack of in-
dependence in regard to a transcendent reality. Therefore 
he interprets the world in terms of a drive, will to 
power, and says that everything is for the best, ·i.e. for 
me. 
3Nietzsche, Ec~e Homo, p. 258. 
4 Actually one cannot meaningfully speak of being 
true to one's drives. Nietzsche is unable to be true to 
Se11~ishness 
Our ordinary way of speaking of a person concerned 
only with what is subjectively satisfying is to say that 
he is selfish. Nietzsche uses this term frequently with 
• 
a positive rather than a negative connotation. 
At this point the real answer to the question how one 
becomes what one is, can no longer be avoided. And 
thus I touch on the masterpiece of the art of self-
preservation--of selfishness. 
9 
For let us assume that the task, the destiny, the 
fate of the task transcends the average very signifi-
cantly: in that case, nothing could be more dangerous 
than catching sight of oneself with this task. To be-
come what one is, one must not have the faintest no-
tion what one is •••• Morally speaking: neighbor 
love, living for others, and other things~ be a 
protective measure for preserving the hardest self-
concern. This is the exception where against my wont 
and conviction, I side with the 'selfless' drives; 
here they work in the service of self-love, of self-
discipline.5 
Nietzsche does not wish to speak of becoming what 
one is as a goal or ~deal to strive for, rather it is 
something which more or less happens when one allows the 
6 
instincts and natural capacities to freely develop. So 
his self but is true to his fate, actually identifying 
himself with his fate and so with necessity. Though he 
insists On his independence and strength he finds it 
necessary to identify himself with something greater--
fate. 
5Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, pp. 25J-5l~. Actually in 
selfishness one does not become one's true self but wants 
to become what one is not, a self-centered totally in-
dependent and powerful person. We will see later how 
Kierkegaard speaks of the self in despair willing to be 
the self which it is not. 
6This does not mean that Nietzsche believes that a 
great man is one who gives in to all his impulses. Rather 
he is one who sublimates his drives, uses his impulses un-
10 
he has this curious combination of' a person who always 
seeks what is best for himself without knowing at all what 
that self might be. For Nietzsche the self is only some-
thing abstract, he does not wish to admit the limitations 
of a concrete ideal, a distinct individual person. 
In connection with this idea as quoted above 
Nietzsche uses the te:i::m "morally" and it will be inter-
esting to see what he means by it. In the context it 
seems that whatever is selfish is moral. Anything which 
serves self-concern is morally good and that which hinders 
.self-concern is morally .bad. This is indeed a turning 
about of the general idea that ~orality is something ob-
jective which belongs to the realm of value, . the important 
in-itself, not the subjectively satisfying which is always 
concerned with what is satisfying for a person. Of course 
Nietzsche was aware of the significance of the term "moral" 
and the fact that he wishes to use it for his own purposes 
seems to indicate that he has some understanding of the 
power of the moral realm. 
This leads us to consideration of another way in 
which Nietzsche has tried to substitute the realm of the 
subjectively satisfying for that of value. He says he 
favors what is selfless because it may serve what is sel-
fish. Another way of saying this is that what is gener-
til he can again let them go, knowing that they will serve 
his best interests. · Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 
Philosopher~ Psychol ogist , Antichrist (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1968 1 , pp. 220-225. . 
1 1 
ally considered important i .n-i tself---morali ty--is con-
sidered to be important by Nietzsche only because he sees 
it as important for himself. But removing the notion of 
importance-in-itself from value makes it indistinguishable 
from the subjectively satisfying. So although Nietzsche 
speaks often of values and his new relation to them ., he 
is really in the realm of the subjectively satisfying, for 
he will not admit that values are given from outside a 
person and that they have an importance of their own apart 
from him. 
Nietzsche speaks of his task, or at least the task 
of the Overman, Zarathustra, as being the transvaluation 
of all values. By this is meant a turning around of 
values, as was mentioned above with·reference to the term 
"moral." Nowhere is this more evident than in relation 
to the source of values. Nietzsche views it as a .sign of 
weakness to acknowledge that values come from outside the 
person. The Overman must be the creator of his own 
values. 
That is your whole will, you who are wisest: a will 
to power--when you speak of good and evil too, and of 
valuations. You still want to create the world before 
which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and 
intoxication.7 
Overman does not wish to acknowledge that anything is irn-
7Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in 
Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. by Walter Kau:frnann · 
(New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 225. Cf. Nietzsche, 
The Will~ Power, p. 85. 
12 
portant in-its elf for he feels that this wj_ll lessen his 
own importance. 
Nietzsche does not recognize that anything impo ,rtant 
in-itself really exists. He thinks that man posited the 
realm of the beyond or the in-itself in order to ex~lain 
feelings within himself which seemed strange, overpowering, 
8 or superhwnan. Because of hi .s narrow view that impor-
tance is always related to a person Nietzsche does not 
recognize the fact that a genuine response to something 
bey-0nd man is possible. "At bottom, man has lost the 
faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whore 
works through him; i.e. , he conceived such a whoJ.e in 
order to be able to believe in his o,'YTI value. 119 Wb.ile it 
is true that there is a connection between value and a 
person's value, it is not true that man conceives Value 
in order to believe in himself'. This is the way l'fietzsche 
related to "value"; by seeing Overman as the giver of' 
values, Overman has ultimate importance. Kierkegaard will 
explore the idea that man responds to value because a 
response is due, and from this response a true notion of' 
the self does arise. 
8c:f'. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 85-87. 
9Ibid., p. 12. 
' 
Cf'. Ibid. , p. 
III. KIERKEGAARD: SELF AS THE I NDIVIDUAL BEFORE GOD 
In this chapter we will see that for Kierkegaard 
man is t ruly himself only when he re c ognizes himself as 
spirit, as an individual before God. Since God is the 
Ultimate Value, Kierkegaard is in the realm of value here. 
The more one is consciou s of ' one se l1 ~ as e x isting before 
God the more self one has. For Kierkegaard man ought to 
be motivated by his desi .re to be related to God, not by -
his desire t o become himself. The true consciousne ss o f 
oneself com e s onl y through despair as fa r as Ki e r k egaard 
is concern e d. 
In contrast to Nietzsche's descr~ption of th e person 
who has turned out well we have Ki e rkegaard's desoripti o n 
o .f a person whose life is wasted • 
• • • But only that IP-an1 s life is wasted who lived on, 
so deceived by t he joys of life or by i t s s~rrows tha t 
he never bec ame eternally and decisi v ely con s cious of 
himself as spirit, as self, or (what is the same 
thing) never beca me aware and in the deepes t s ense re-
ceived an imp r ession of the fact that there is a God, 
ai1.d tha t he, he h:imself, his self, exists bei' o re this 
God, which gain of infinity is never attained e x cept 
through despair. 1 
Kierkegaard does not view here the realm of the subjec-
tively satisfying as most important for a person as 
1spren Kierkegaard, Th e Sir, k ness Unto Death in Fear 
and Tremblin g/ Th e Sic k n e s s Un tS!_ De a t h , t r a n s . b y Wal t er 
Lowri e (G a rd e n Ci t y, New York: Doubl e d a y and Company, 
Inc., 1954), pp. 159- 60. 
1J 
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Nietzsche does, rather he seei;; that a per s on wbo is con-
cerned only with making himse .lf happy and avoiding any 
sorrow is wasting his life. Kierkegaard is primarily con-
cerned with that which is beyond the subjectively satisfy-
ing, value,. 
Three ideas are very closely related for . Kierke-
gaard: that man is spirit, that man is self, and that man 
exists before God. Indeed Kierkegaard says that for a man 
to be aware that he is spir~t or self is the same thing as 
the recognition that God is and that man exists before 
this God. God is the Ultimate Value, more than anything 
else He 1s important in Himself. Therefore a rnan 1 s recog-
nitj_on of the fact that he exist s before God and what this 
entails is basically a relation ta the Ul t imate Value. 
Whereas Von Hildebrand speaks of the response which is 
demanded by a value Kierkegaard speaks of the self as 
being properly related to God if it is to become itself. 
These are different ways of speaking about the same basic 
phenomenon. We can see here Kierkegaard's ·. implicit no-
tion that a man who has lived fully, not wasted h.is life, 
is one who is concerned with the realm of value. 
Consciousness and the Self 
The relation between consciousness of God and aware-
ness of the self is made very clear in Kierkegaard's 
writing in these two parallel passages. 
Generally speaKing, consciousness, i.e. consciousness 
of self, is the decisive criterion o:f the self. The 
more consciousness, the more self •• 
• • • 4 
The more conception of· God, the more self; the more 
self, the more conception of God. Only when the self 
as this defini te individu~l is conscious of existing 
before God, only then is it the infinite self. • 2 
15 
These quotations show that Kierkegaard in speaking of 
consciousness is not talking about merely an intensifica-
tion of self-awareness as might be present in Nietzsche's 
well-turned-out man who is very much attuned to what is 
"good" for him. Rather he is speaking of a consciousness 
in which a person is aware of his true self and meta-
physical condition, that he is an individual before God. 
This notion that it is necessary for a person to 
have a c ·oncept of God in order to become his true self is 
also connected with the idea of fate. We saw that for 
Nietzsche amor fati is the formula for human greatness. 
Kierkegaard strongly disagrees with this. 
The determinist or the fatalist is in despair, and in 
despair he has lost his self, because for him every-
thing is necessary • 
• • • The fatalist is in despair--b.e has lost Go.d., 
and therefore himself as well; for if he has no God, 
neither has he a self. But the fatalist has no God, 
:; or, what is the same thing, his god is necessity • 
• • • The worship of the fatalist is there fo re at 
its maximum an exclamation, and essentially it is 
dumbness, dU1"11b submission, he is unable to pray.3 
Man must always have possibility, the possibility of re-
2
Ibid., p. 162, p. 211. 
'":\ 
.JI bid. , p. 1 7 J • 
spending to value, of beini related to God, in order to 
become himself. 
Ni.etzsche thought tha.t whenever a man responded to 
a power greater than himself he became a slave to that 
power. So he saw all relations between man and God as 
16 
slave-master relations. Kierkegaard challenges this with 
the view that it is the fatalist who is a slave, a slave 
to necessity. For the fatalist no genuine free response 
is possible. A person who believes submits in obedience 
to God, but this is not a slavish act but a full personal 
response to the call of value. Such a person realizes " 
that a response is due the value, ye~ he is not forced to 
respond. 
The only response which Nietzsche is prepared to 
allow, is a response which will serve the inter ests of the 
person. A response for the sake o!~ the value is ~l·ways 
seen as slavery; one only responds when it serves selfish-
ness. This is a critical difference between Nietzsche 
and Kierkegaard. For Nietzsche one seeks that which will 
serve the development of Overman. For Kierkegaard one 
should seek to be properly related to God, and the self 
then emerges from this relationship. Von Hildebrand 
states, 
Man as subject and per s on is ordered and destined to 
this personal relation with God, his nature is or-
dained to transcend itself and to be capable of a 
real self-donation. The I~act that this self-donation 
is the exclusive ,way for man to attain his perfection, 
that is, to actualize all the values which he is able 
and destined to realiz e , in no way implies that the 
self-donation is a mere means for self-perfection.4 
17 
Von Hildebrand here makes the connection which we men-
tioned before between the response to value and the rela-
tionship to God. This quote which so clearly distin-
~iishes the motivation (relationship to God) from the 
consequences (self-perfection) helps to make clear the 
differences between Nietzsche and Kj_erkegaard. Kierke-
gaard reaffirms the Christian notion that one must lose 
oneself in _order to find oneself. For all of his emphasis 
upon subj ec ti vi ty Kierkegaard would never hold that a m"an 
becomes his true self by striving to do so, but only by 
being an individual before God. 
Consciousness and DespaiE 
One must recognize that one is an individual·before 
God in order to become one's true self, and yet K±erke-
gaard stated above that this "gain of infinity is never 
attained except through despair." For Kierkegaard if one 
wills to be oneself apart from one's relation to God then 
one is in despair. For Nietzsche one must will to · be 
oneself independently of any greater power if one is to 
become oneself. 
Despair is the sickness of the soul, the "sickness 
4von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. 222. Cf. Dietrich Von 
Hildebrand, Lit u rgy and- Pe rs on al it v ( Bal t imore: Helicon 
Press, 1960), p. 46 , in which he t alks about the fact 
that the personal transformation should never be th e 
motivation for value response. 
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unto death." Because all men have sinned, all men are in 
1despair. 
The possibility of this sickness is man's advantage 
over the beast; to be sharply observant of this sick-
ness constitutes the Christian's advantage over the 
natural man; to be healed of this sickness is the 
Christian's bliss. 
So then it is an infinite advantage to be able to 
despair; and yet it is not only the greatest misfor-
tune and misery to be in despair; no, it is perdition. 5 
Here again the notion of consciousness in relation to the 
self is present. Man's ability to despair, his self-
consciousne -ss makes him different from animals. But 
heightened consciousness is not enough, one must have 
true consciousness, i.e., a recognition of the fact that 
one is an individual before God. One goes through despair 
to a realization of oneself as spirit, but again it is the 
relationship to God rather · than the development of self 
which is the motivating factor. This realization of 
oneself as spirit is not referring to spirit in the onto-
logical sense of man being spirit, conscious, in order to 
hope or despair. When Kierkegaard refers to man as 
spirit he is referring to the fact that he can be related 
to ; God. 
Kierkegaard speaks of several stages of despair: 
First comes despair over the earthly or something 
earthly, then despair over oneself about the eternal. 
Then comes defiance, which really is despa:Lr by the 
aid of the eternal, the despairing abuse of the 
eternal in the self to the point of being despairingly 
determined to be on e self •••• The despair which is 
the passageway to faith is also by the aid of the 
5Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 148. 
eternal; by the aid of t he eternal the self has 6 courage to lose itself in order to gain itself. 
One despairs over the earthly when one gets so bound up 
in the earthly, the finite, that one allows it to become 
all important. This is a person who is caught up in the 
joys and sorrows of life and so has wasted his life. 
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Man can only become a self because the eternal, God, 
has allowed him to become one. At the same time eternity 
demands that one become a self. In experiencing this ten-
sion one can turn to faith or despair. If one despairs 
over oneself about the eternal, one feels that the demand 
to become oneself is too great and so on _e loses hope. 
This is an example of what results from a narrowness which 
looks only to a person and sees nothing beyond. 
There are two stages . of despair by the aid of the 
eternal. The first is defiance. It is the eternal in 
man which allows him to become a self, but a person who 
is defiant feels he can use the eternal for his own pur-
poses. On his own power he feels he can become himself. 
Yet it j_s not his own power but the eternal whi<;:h enables 
him to feel this way. One who defiantly wills to be one-
self is actually denying one's true self, for one's true 
self is related to God. The motivating factor in defiance 
is to overcome despair and become one's self. 
In the despair which is the passageway to faith on 
6Ibid., p. 201. 
the other hand one does not abuse the eternal and try to 
use it for one's own ends. Rather one acknowledges the 
eternal and allows that one must give the eternal its 
due. By so doing the self is willing to lose itself, to 
admit that it cannot become itself on its own and so re-
lies on God to make the impossible possible. In despair 
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which leads to faith, one does not overcome despair by 
willing to be oneself but by hoping in God, by recognizing 
that one is an individual existing before God who must 
respond to Him for His own sake. 
There is something of a paradox here, for if despair 
is the opposite of faith how can despair be the passageway 
to faith. This despair is the recognition of the fact 
that one is finite, _ and alone can _do nothing. 
The despairer understands that it is weakness to take 
the earthly so much to heart, that it i .s weakness to 
despair. But then, instead of veering sharply·away 
from despair to faith, humbling himself before God for 
his weakness, he is more deeply
7
absorbed in despa±r 
and despairs over his weakness. 
This despair can be the passageway to faith if one accepts 
one's limits and then believes that with God all things 
are possible. 
hope. 
In which case it is no , longer despair but 
Although Kierkegaard speaks of these stages of 
despair, one is better than another only when considered 
7 Ibid. , p. 1 9 5. 
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from ·the limited viewpoint of intensity of consciousness. 
To become the self, existing before God, the only true 
alternative to any form of despair i~ faith. 
There is no merit in being in -despair in a higher 
degree. Aesthetically it is an advantage, for aesthe-
tically one has regard merel .y to strength; but ethi-
__ cally the more intense kind of despair is further from 
salvation than is the lower. 8 
We will consider further the meaning of despair in be-
coming a self after first examining several ideas con-
cerning power. 
8
Ibid., p. 232. When Kierkegaard speaks of aesthe-
tics, he is not referring primarily to the realm of beauty 
but to the realm of feeling. Consider the following quote 
from Conrad Bonifazi, Christendom Attacked: A Com arison 
of' Kierkegaard and Nietzsche London: Rock i iff, 19 53 , 
p. 124. This quote shows the relationship between the 
aesthetic and the true relation to God. 
"For this reason [Romanticism's making of religion a 
pantheism] Kierkegaard wished to dethrone the aesthetic 
way of life, to make the disclosur e that a natural 
awakening within the soul to the all-pervading pre-
sence of the Divine was falsely identified with true 
Chris ·tian faith, and to combat an intimate mixture of 
Christianity with present sentiments, in order to 
bring to evidence the fact that Christianity is not a 
poetical Weltanschauung, but a new beginning, by the 
grace of God, of a life beyond human possibility alone." 
IV. THE NOTIONS OF POWER 
In this chapter we will look at various notions of 
power. First we will look at the meanings of the term 
powBr as we ordinarily use it. In this context we will 
be concerned with power as a capacity; with mastery or 
the development of powers; and with power and its relation 
to control. Then we will examine Nietzsche's philosophy 
of will to power which 1s a central concept to his entire 
philosophy. Finally we will see how power fits into Kier-
kegaard's philosophys especially in relation · to despair. 
Mean~ngs of Power 
There are several ways in which we use the term 
power in our ordinary language. When we say that someone 
has the power to do something we might mean two things. 
Power might mean ability, e.g. if we say, "He has the 
power to pick up the book" we mean that he is physically 
able, he has the capacity to perform the action. However 
if we say that someone has the ability to be an Olympic 
swimmer we are referring not merely to his physical capa-
city but also to the fact that he has mastered certain 
skills. We might say that his powers had been developed. 
In either case the person has the power whether he is ac-
tually perfoiming the action or not. However, a power is 
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only evident through action. In bot h of these cases po,ve:r 
refers to the ability to control the world, in this in-
stance one's body and its physical motions. This notion 
of control is very important to the notion of power. 
In addition to physical control we also speak of 
self-control or self-discipline. But here again we are 
primarily concerned with actions. With regard to self'-
control or discipline someone like Hj_ tler mj_ght be equal 
to Florence Nightingale. Both were able to discipline 
themselves in such a way that they might achieve a desired 
goal. But there is a di .fference between a person who is 
considered strong because of his self-control and a person 
who has strength of character, 
Strength of c_haracter has something to do with dis-
cipline, with the power to control one's drives or urges 
in such a way that they are integrated into one's ·whole 
personality. The power to control a drive is not just the 
power to control actions. A drive or an urge issomething 
which pushes a person from behind, it has power over him 
and comes from a need which he has. 
Perhaps an example will clarify the fa.ct th.atone has 
not controlled an urge just by controlling actions. Per-
haps a man has a strong urge to drink and not w~shing to 
become an alcoholic he tries to stop drinking. He may 
discover that he especially feels like drinking when he 
i::; lonely. So he finds someone to fill his loneliness 
and so no longer drinks. Yet he is still within the realm 
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of needs. It is just that his need for companionship was 
stronger than his need to drink. 
The controlling of drives involves motivation or 
meaning. As long as one is motivated by trying to fulfill 
the drive or need, one is being motivated from ,vithj_n. 
But there is another possibility of motivation · besides 
need and this is love. When one is motivated by lov e one 
is responding to that which is good in the other, rather 
than to the attraction of something which one sees as 
satisfying a need which is within. 
This turning from the need within to the call of 
the other can be termed conversion. It is this power of 
conversion which enables one to control drives, not just 
will power or self-control. It ls the strength of the 
appeal of the value which allows one to move from the 
immanent realm of need to the transcendent realm of love. 
One's will is essential to the conversion experience but 
it is not sufficient for it. The appeal of the other is 
that it is good and one should respond appropriately. TlL~s 
response is one of self-donation. On~ is not converted 
by will power but the will is necessary in that one freely 
gives his response to the other because it is due him. 
One responds to what is positive or of value in the other, 
rather than being concerned with the lack or nothingness 
in oneself which one feels in need. Here we have seen how 
the realms of the subjectively satisfying and of value are 
related to the noti ons of power. 
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Nietzsche and Power 
In this section of the chapter we will be concerned 
with Nietzsche's philosophy of power. For ~etziche life 
is w.iJ..l to power and power is concerned both with control 
and with one's instincts. Will to power is · greatest in 
those with 2.rnor f'ati, those vd;o love their i~ate. In 
:'drive for power a nihilist. E'or Nietzsc n e 
pernaps the ultimate power is achieved when one destro ·.:.rs 
values r.i:nd crea:tl~S new on.es .fur onese !'. Any recognition 
or an objective value or of a greater power than oneself 
is a sign of weakness for Nietzsche. 
Let us examine the ways in which Nietzsche uses the 
notion of power. Nietzsche states that "Life is will to 
1 power." Several things are evident just in that one 
phrase. The fact that life is equated with will to power 
indicates that for Nietzsche this will to power is all 
encompassing. He views everything i _n terms of will to 
power. All actions are motivated by this will to power. 
"Will to power" itself indicates that power is an end. 
One does ·not use power for something else but one moves 
always with an eye to increasing power. 
It is clear from many passages that when Nj_etzsche 
uses the term power he is concerned with control, and es-
pecially with identifying power with the realm of in-
1Niatzsche, The Will to Power, p. 148. · 
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. stincts. He speaks precisely in the terms outlined above 
about power being concerned with controlling the world and 
then with self control in the following passage. 
Evolution of ma n 
a. to gain power ov er 
tain power over oneself. 
man might prevail in his 
'wild animal. 1 ) 
nature and in addition acer-
(Morality was needed t hat 
struggle with nature and the 
b. If power has been attained over nature, one can 
employ this power in the further free development of 
oneself: will to power as self-elevation and streng-
thening.J 
tion: 
Two things are especially important in this quota-
one is the notion that morality is seen as good by 
Nietzsche only when it advances the person, in this case 
when it helps man gain power over nature; the second is 
that will to power is seen as self-elevation arid str eng-
thening. Here again we see that this strengthening of th e 
self is - an end for Nietzsche and that everything is viewed 
in terms of its "goodness" for the self, the realm of 
the subjectively satisfying. 
Nietzsche has a curious notion of wj_J.l. He does not 
agree with the idea that man has a free will which is his 
great po~er and his great responsibility. Nietzsche sees 
freedom of the will as _the means by which Christianity has 
-- 4 
made men feel guilty for their actions. Von Hildebrand 
2 . 
Cf. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 2JJ-J5, pp. 220-25 • 
. 3Nietzsche, The WilJ. to Power, p. 218. 
4
cf. Ibid., p. 2J2. Also Nietzsche, Genealogy of 
Morals, pp. 59-60, p. 69. 
describes will in the following way: 
The will is in our immediate power. Its unique 
character is clearly revealed by the fact that its 
immediate issuance from our spiritual center is the 
only case of a fiat in our human existence.5 
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By this is meant that as soon as we will anything the act 
of ·wi.11 is immediately present. We are the source of our 
acts of the will. Nietzsche would say that it is not so 
much that the will is in our power, but rather that will 
is our power. One has power because of an act of the 
will. Niet .zsche claims that all will or in any case 
greatest will is will to power. Von Hildebrand would s.ay 
that the will as it is necessary to value response is the 
most fitting act of the will. For Nietzsche will is not 
concerned with conscious control but the will to power 
is the development of one's own instincts. 
This relationship of power to instincts is very im-
portant to Nietzsche's thought. When he speaks of Overman 
as the ~ltimate manifestation of will to power, he does 
not wish to speak of him as an ideal, but rather as some-
thing like the ultimate natural man. This is evident in 
the following passage in which Nietzsche speaks of him-
self. 
Its [my instinct's] higher protection manifested its elf 
to • such a high degree that I never even suspected what 
was growing in me--and one day all my capacities, 
suddenly ripe, leaped forth in their ultimate perfec-
tion. I cannot remember that I ever tried hard--no ? 
trace of struggle can be demonstrated in my life; I 
5von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. 201. 
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am - the opposite of a heroic nature. 'Willing' some-
thing, 'striving' f or something, envisaging a 'purpose,' 
a 'wish'--I know none of this from experience. 6 
Here Nietzsche makes clear that all his power is in his 
natural capacities, everything is within. Kierkegaard 
will disagree strongly ,;·li th this view that the perfection 
of one's immanent capacities is the greatest perfection 
for man. 7 
Power and amor fati 
It may be noted here that Nietzsche's description 
of himself in the above passage indicates how his notion 
of will to power is related to the idea -of~ f'ati. In 
amor fati one wills nothing to be different, yet Nietzsche 
also says that for those who are strongest their whole 
will is the will to power. So it would seem that will to 
power is identical with loving one's fate. Indeed 
Nietzsche has said he did not will or strive for anything 
but rather found his capacities suddenly developed and 
accepted himself as he was. Nietzsche describes more 
clearly in the following passage how he views power and 
will . 
..L assess the power of a will by how much resistance, 
pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its 
advantage. I do not account the evil and painful 
6 . 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, pp. 254-55. 
7see Kierkegaa_rd, The Sickness Unto Death, pp. 179 
and 189. 
character of existence a reproach to it, but hope 
rather that it will one day be more evil and painful 
than hitherto. 8 
Here the strongest will is one which can love its fate. 
It is interesting to note that here again the notion of 
importance for oneself is present. A will is strong not 
only because it endures, but because it endures for its 
own advantage. F'or the Christian one endures suffering 
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because .it is demanded by a higher value and though it 
may prove to be beneficial to the development of oneself, 
this is not the purpose for submitting to the suffering. 
Nietzsche evidently hopes that life will become more evil 
and painful for then one could show greater power in en-
. . 
during greater suff'ering. The Christian submits in 
obedience to the demands of value, but endurance of 
suffering is not the only response, and in any case the 
motivation is not the development of the self. 
Will to power and values 
We have seen how the will to power is concerned with 
self-fulfillment and the subjectively satisfying. Now 
let us look specifically at how the will to power is 
related to values. When Nietzsche speaks of values he 
speaks of nihilism. Nietzsche refers to two kinds of 
nihilism, active and passive. In passive nihili~m, one 
views nihilism as an end and lives in total meaningless-
8N· t ' 1 ie zscne, The Will to Power, p. 206. 
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ness with no values at all. In active nihilism one sees 
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oneself as the destro ye r of values. Nihilism is seen as 
a stage which one passes through, rather than as an end 
in itself. Active nihilism is"• • a sign of increased 
power of the -:5piri t. 119 Nietzsche sees himself as such an 
active nihilist. Being able to destroy values increases 
one's power of spirit, in the ontological sense of the 
word. Nietzsche uses spirit here as that which distin-
guishes man from animals or men from men. For Kierkegaard 
spirit is primarily concerned with one's relation to God, 
spirit as concerned with the spiritual. 
Nietzsche notes two causes of nihilism: 
1. The higher species is lacking, i.e., those whose 
inexhaustibl e fertility and power keep up the 
fa.i th in man. • 
2. ~he lower species ( 1 herd ; 1 
learn modesty and blows ug 
and metaphysical values. 1 
'mass, 1 1 society' ' ) un-
its needs into cosmic 
The notion that man can destroy values, or posit them, 
invol v es a failure to recognize the primary fact that 
values are important in themselves, and independent of 
the will , of man. One can refuse to recognize a value, or 
give a negative response to a vaJ .ue, but this does not 
affect the importance of the value itself. Perhaps in-







.values but this is not to say that there is not a great 
difference between needs and values. 
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Nietzsche feels that faith in anyone other .than man 
is a sign of weakness. So he says that men of power are 
needed to keep up the faith in man and so maintain values. 
In contrast, for Kierkegaard, man does admit a certain 
weakness in putting his faith in something beyond himself. 
He admits that on his own he cannot do everythi.ng. Only 
with God are all things possible. Such a man humbly ac-
cepts his weaknesses, his finitude, yet by his relation-
ship to the Infinite, he is actually stronger as a self. 
Nietzsche sees the Overman as the ultimate example 
of one of the higher species who will keep up the faith 
in man. 
Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strong, tempting, 
dangerous ideal, to which we should not wish to per-
suade anybody because we do not readily concede the 
right to it to anybody: the ideal of~ a spirit who 
plays naively, that is not deliberately but from over-
flowing power and abundance--with . all that was hither-
to called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for mom 
· those supreme things that the people naturally accept 
as thej_r value standards signify danger, decay, d e -
basement, or at least recreation, blindness, and tem-
porar-,t self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman 
well-being and benevolence that will often appear in-
.human. 11 
Nietzsche admits here his reservations about the ideal of 
the Overman, perhaps because he has some idea of the in-
trinsic importance of value and recognizes the danger of 
11 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 299. 
of man I s assuming the power of the Infinite for himself. _ 
Tl1e lack of deliberate will is mentioned in this 
passage again. Overman plays with values from his over-
J2 
flowing power. The notion of play not only reiterates 
the association of power with the instincts, but also in-
troduces the idea of a lack of seriousness. 12 · Overman 
sees himself as above values and so able to toy with them. 
He says others accept them as value standards but for him 
they signify decay. Nietzsche returns again to the realm 
of the subjectively satisfying. This image of playing 
with values, of a continual tearing down and building up 
is for Nietzsche the image of the greatest pcwer for man. 1j 
Kierkegaard and Power 
In the final section of this chapter we will deal 
witb . power and its place in Kierkegaard's philosophy. 
Kierkegaard has a different concept of will than Nietzsche. 
For him will is as essential to the self as is conscious-
ness but this is not just wilfulness, but the will neces-
sary for a right relation to God. Kierkegaard does not 
think that man is already a self and that he must just 
12 cf. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 202, 
in which he speaks of the despairing self experimenting 
with his self, acknowledging no power over it and hence 
lacking seriousness. Nietzsche's Overman plays with 
value, yet accepting~ fati as his greatness he has no 
real possibilities in his life. 
13cf. N:i.etzsche, The Will to Power, p. 14, where he 
speaks of nihilism as being "partly destructive, partly 
ironic." 
JJ 
accept this self, rather one becomes a self only be es-
tablishing the right relation to God. One cannot become 
a self merely by developing one's powers. How Kierkegaard 
understands power is most clear in his wri tin.gs on despair. 
In despair one wishes to tear oneself away from the Power 
which constitutes every human self. The despa~ring self 
wishes to have complete control over the process of be-
coming himself. Only by being willingly related to God, 
the greater Power, does one truly become oneself. 
Consciousness, will and self 
Kierk€gaard does not speak specifically of a philo-
sophy o;f power. However he does speak of man's wil .l and 
in writi _ng about despair his views on power are made 
clear. In regard to will Kierkegaard would agree with 
Von Hildebrand's view. Man's will is essential to be-
coming a self, as is his recognition that he is a.Tl in-
d .i viduaJ. before God. 
The . more consciousness, the more self; the more con-
sciousness, the more will, and the more will the more 
self. A man who has no will at all is no self; the 
more will he has, the more consciousness of self he 
has also. 14 
As it was shown above when Kierkegaard refers to 
consciousness of self he is not referring merely to an 
intensified self-awareness, but rather to an awareness of 
oneself as existing before God. So too when he speaks of 
14 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 162. 
the relation of will t o the concept of the self, he does 
not mean that a person who is willful or stubborn has a 
strong concept of the self. For Kierkegaard will, con-
sciousness and self are all relational. , They are always 
in relation to a transcendent Being either in despair or 
in faith. For Nietzsche will and · consciousness and thus 
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t:he self are reflexive. They are turned to the satisfac-
tion of the need within, they are concerned with what is 
good for one and there is no transcending relation. 
Kierkegaard emphasizes "the more will the more self~ 11 
because he realizes that a strong will is absolutely 
necessary to the relation to_God. One responds with 
obedience, with self-donation, to the other when one is 
motivated by the value of the oth~r. Obedience is not a 
slavish act but a free response give~ by a person who 
has the str ength to "will one thing.'' Such a person does 
not view this act of will as an evidence of his power but 
5 
rather as a means to achieving the right relationsr.,ip to 
God, the Ultimate Value. 
The ~elf and possibility 
We saw that Nietzsche thin.~s a man only becomes 
what he already in some way is; and that one can best be-
come what one is by merely allowing one's capacities to 
develop and by i'ollowing one I s instincts. Kierkegaard 
has this to say: 
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However, a self, every instant it exists is in process 
of becoming, for the self Ktirg.. d-ir0 ~.L{, lY-L Potentially] 
does not actually exist, it is only that which it is 
to become. In so far as the self does not become 
itself, it is not its own self; but not to be ones own 
self is despair. 15 
An analogy may make clearer the differences between 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. For Nietzsche the process of 
becoming oneself is very much like the process of an ac~rn 
becoming an oak. The acorn has the potential to ba::ome the 
oak if it is allowed to develop. For Kierkegaard the 
process of .becoming oneself is more like the uniting of 
sperm and egg. On its own neither the sperm nor the egg 
has the potential to develop into a baby. Each does have 
the possibility for being united with the other and then 
developing. Kierkegaard sees that ::nan has the possibility 
of being related to God and so of' becoming himself. More 
will be said on this idea in relation to the notions of 
.immanence and transcendence. The important thing to note 
here is that Kierkegaard does not regard the development 
of one's powers as central t o the process of becoming 
oneself'. 
As a further amplification of the ideas that a 
strong will is necessary for a strong concept of self and 
that becoming one's self is not an automatic process, 
Kierkegaard has the following comment: "No, whatever it 
15 Ibid., p. 163. Kierkegaard is speaking here of 
the self that is grounded transparently in God, the true 
self. 
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.may be that a man as a matter of course comes to, and 
whatever it may be that comes to a man as a matter of 
course--one thing it is not, namely, faith and wisdom." 16 
Faith is the way a man is related to God and so is the 
way he becomes himself. This does not come as a matter 
of course, by allowing one's capacities to develop. If 
a man came to faith and wisdom as a matter of course, 
then~ fati, not willing anything to be different, 
would surely be the way to faith. However to attain 
faith and wisdom in fact a man must will that something 
be different, namely that he move from despair to hope. 
Kierkegaard analyzes the person who thi:rik.B that he 
becomes himself by allowing his capacities to develop. 
Every human existence which is not conscious of itself 
as spirit, or conscious of itself before God as 
spirit, every human existence which is not thus 
grounded transparently in God but obscurely reposes 
or terminates in some abstract universality (state, 
nation, etc.) or in obscurity about itself takes its 
facultj_es merely as active powers, without in a deeper 
sense being conscious whence it h£1s them, which re-
gards itself as an inexplicable something which is to 
be understood from without--every such existence, 
whatever it accomplishes, though it be the most 
amazing exploit, whatever it explains, though it were 
the whole of existence, however intensely it enjoys 
life aesthetically--every such existence is after all 
despair. 17 · 
In this passage Kierkegaard states that a person who is 
16
Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 192. 
17~., p. 179. See also page 189 of the same work 
in which Kierkegaard mentions how some people identify 
their self with their abilities or talents. 
not c-0nscious of himself as existing before God is ob-
scure about the nature of his self. Such a person mis-
ta.ke ,nly looks at the active powers which he can develop, 
rather than being aware that . the important thing is to 
acknowledge that these powers have been given to him by 
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a greater Power. A person who does not have true con-
sciousness may show great power, through his actions, the 
greatness of his intellect, or the intensity of his ex-
periences, but such a person is here living in despair. 
One is reminded here of the biblical question, "What does 
i .t profit a man if he gain the whole world, but loses his 
own soul." This is exactly what is at issue here. A 
person who is concerned with developing his powers and 
with achieving greatness in his ~ife actually loses his 
true self, though he claims to be acting in self-interest. 
In fact it is because of his being motivated by self-
interest, that the self becomes obscure. 
Power and despair 
Let us look more closely at the various ways power 
is related to despair. One form of despair Kierkegaard 
describes as going astray into possibility. To become a 
self one must realize that one is a definite individual 
before God. By always wishing for or fearing some pos-
sibi1ity a person is unable to become such a definite in-
dividual. One does not wish to accept what one is as a 
,; 
definite and limited ontological self who may be uniquely 
,, 
related to God as intentional self, but rather one looks 
always .for soine new possibility. Man is a synthesis of 
possibility and necessity. 
Nor is it merely due to lack of strength when the 
J8 
soul goes astray in possibility--at least this is not 
to be understood as people commonly understand it. 
What really is lacking is the power to obey ~ to submit 
to the necessary in oneself, to what may be called 
one's limit. 18 
Here we see again that becoming oneself is not in one's 
power, in the ordinary sense. It is not lack of strength 
/( 
or self-control which causes this despair. 
Kierkegaard talks about the power to obey or to 
·submit, Ordinarily this would seem like a contradiction 
in terms. The fact that Kierkegaard uses them indicates 
that there is another sense in which one may speak of 
strength or power. One mi ·ght call this strength of per-
~onality, noting that a personality is related to the 
realm of value. When we think of value response and re-
member that it requires a strong will then the notion of 
the power to obey does not seem so strange. 
Nietzsche speaks of obedience in a different way. 
"But wherever I found the living, there I heard also the 
speech on obedience. Whatever lives obeys. 1119 It might 
18
Ibid., p. 169. One's limit is one's nature or 
essence which i .s only understood in relation to God. This 
is the ontological self and as such it is necessary, but 
this necessity is not the same as the necessity of fate, 
it does not determine the future. It is here that possi-
bility becomes part of the self. 
19Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 226. 
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-seem -that on the surface Nietzsche a grees with Kierkegaard. 
The important thing to note is that Nietzsche makes no 
distinction between the "obedience" which is natural to 
all living things, an instinctual obedience, and the 
obedience which is unique1 .y human, a free act motivated 
by value. For Nietzsche one's nature develops inexorably 
toward the fulfillment of its potential. For Kierkegaard 
man has the power to obey, to accept his limits, and also 
-the possibility of being related to God, of transcending 
himself. 
Kiezkegaard spoke . of the power to submit to the 
necessary in oneself, to one's limits. However this is 
not just an obedience to something within oneself, for 
it is because man ~s seen in relation to the Infinite, 
that he must recognize his own limits. Recognition of 
--0ne's own finitude must also be a recognition and·ac-
knowledgement of the Infinite. 
For the self is a synthesis in which the finite is the 
limiting factor, and the infinite is the expanding 
factor. Infinitude's despair is therefore the fan-
·tastical, · the limitless. The self is in sound heal th 
and free from despair only when precisely by having 20 been in despair, it is grounded transparently in God. 
One can be in despair by being too narrow or l±mited, or 
by thinking -oneself to be limitless. A desire for power 
·seems to at least tend toward the idea of being unlimited 
2 °Kierkegaard! The Sickness Unto De a th, p. 163. 
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and this is especially so 1 n Niet zsc he's Overman.
21 
Here 
Kierkegaard speaks to Nietzsche's ideal of the Overman by 
stating that such a person is in despair, not in sound 
health as a self. A self is in sound health only when it 
recognizes that it exists as an individual (limited) be-
fore God (Limitless). 
It must be remembered that the self is a synthesis 
of the finite and the infinite. One must not only recog-
nize that one is limited, but also that there is something 
of the infinite and the eternal in the self. Kierkegaard 
talks about what results when one tries to view this in-
finite aspect of the self apart from the Power in which 
one must be grounded to he free of despair. 
rn order to will in despair to be oneself there must 
be consciousness of the infinite self. Thi s infinite 
self, however, is really only t he abstrac t est form, 
the abstractest possibility of the self, and it is 
this self the . man despairingly wills to be, dei:aching 
the self from every relation to the Power which posited 
it, or detaching it from the conception . that there is 
such a Power in existence. 22 
In this passage Kierkegaard shows that consciousness of 
the infinite self can have both positive and negative as-
pects. This consciousness is necessary to becoming a 
sel.f, yet without relating the inf 'ini t e self to the Power 
from which it comes one ends again in despair. 23 Only in 
21
cf. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 305 and p~ JJ1. 
22 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto De at h , p. 201. 
23 Abstract possibility leads to despair because then 
nothing is possible, whereas with God alone are all thing s 
possible. Thus t he infinite in t he self can be concre-
tized in the relation to God. 
relation to God does this abstract possibility of a self 
become concretized in the definite individual. 
Kierkegaard speaks directly about the desire of 
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the despairing self to make itself into itself. One wants 
to feel the satisfaction of having mastery over oneself, 
to be able to control the process of becoming oneself. 
Overman seems to want just this experience of satisfaction 
at becoming himself through will to power. However, 
Kierkegaard reiterates that a self who wants to be its 
own master ·j_s really in despair and is like a king wj_ thout 
a country. One who wants to be master of himself finds 
that there is really no self there. One becomes a self 
only by being related to a greater Power, not be exer-
• • I 24 cising ones own power. 
Kierkegaard would agree with Nietzsche's description 
of the Overman as one who plays with values from over-
flowing power. However he would not agree to this de-
scription as pertaining to the self. 
If the despairing self is active, it really is related 
to itself only as experimenting with whatsoever it be 
-that it undertakes, however great it may be, ··however 
astonishing, however persistently carried out~ It 
acknowledges no power over it, hence in the Tast 
resort it lacks seriousness when the self bestows upon 
its experiments its utmost attention. 2 5 · ·· 
. 24 cf. The Sickness Unto Death, p. 20J. Again for 
Kierkegaard becoming oneself is the consequence of the • 
right relation to God, not the reason for the relation-
ship. 
25 Ibid., p. 202 • 
. ---
Lack ·of seriousness is characteristic of play and this 
lack of seriousness about the self results from failure 
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to acknowledge the Power in which the self is grounded. 
One hears again here the theme of gaining the world and 
losing one's soul. Also we find in the passage hirits 
about the self's being related to itself. In despair the 
self cannot be properly related to itself because it is 
not properly related to the Power which constitutes ·+ J. V 0 
Kierkegaard has spoken of ways in which those who 
seek power over themselves are in despair. There is one 
:further way in which despair and power are related. 
The despairer understands that it is weakness to take 
the earthly so much to heart, that it is weakness to 
despair. But then instead of veering sharply away 
from despair to faith, humbling himself before God 
for his weakness he is ~ore dee~!Y absorbed in despair 
and despairs over his weakness. 
The vicious circle in which the despairer finds himself 
gives some indication that intensification of conscious-
ness, recognition of the weakness of · despair is not enough 
:for one to become oneself. One must recognize that one .is 
an individual before God, with all this entails regarding 
one's finitude and weakness and God's Infinity and Power. 
The inability to admit a weakness is ultimately the same 
thing as a will to power. 
Kierkegaard summarizes the forms of despair and 
shows how they can ail be traced to one form, all in-
26 ..... b·d 195 ~-, p. • 
volving an improper relationship to the Power which con-
stitutes the self. 
To despair over oneself, in despair to will to be rid 
of oneself, is the formula for all despair, and hence 
the second form of despair (in despair at willing to 
4-:3 
be oneself) can be followed back to the first (in 
despair at not willing to be oneself) .••• That self 
which he despairingly wills to be is a self which he 
is not · (for to will to be that self which one truly is, 
is indeed the opposite of despair); what he really wills 
is to tear his self away from the Power which consti-
tuted it •••• notwithstanding all the efforts of 
despair, that Power is the stronger, and it compells 
him to be the self he does not will to be. 2 7 
There are several things which are important to note 
here. First of all, in all forms of despair one wants to 
get rid of one's true self, that self wh~ch exists as an 
individual before God. If one wills oneself to be some-
thing else than what it is, then one is in despair. 
Willing to be onets true .self is the opposite of despair--
·fai th. . Next there is the idea that the cons ti tu ting Power 
is stronger than despair. This is a consequence of the 
fact that only with God are a .11 things possible. Indeed 
to see that one is helpless to change something and to 
conclude that therefore change is impossible is itself a 
form of despair. Despair is impotent before the consti-
tuting Power in that in despair one cannot be one's true 
self, only in relation to God can one be his true self. 
The constituting Power compels one to be oneself in the 
sense that one cannot be rid of despair in any other way 
27~., p. 153. 
way t ·han by being rela t ed to the constituting Power. As 
long as -one is in despair, the greater Power demands its 
due response and proper relationship. 
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Nietzsche views the demands of the greater Power as 
being a demand that one give up one's self and become a 
slave. Nietzsche does not recognize the difference be-
tween the overpowering attraction which comes from a 
drive or urge and the sovreign appeal or call of a value 
which comes from its importance. 
this difference. 
Von Hildebrand describes 
The call of an authentic value for an adequate response 
addresses itself to us in a sovreign but non-intrusive, 
sober way. It appeals to our free spiritual center. 
The attraction of the subjectively satisfying, on the 
contrary, lulls us into a state where we yield to in-
stinct; it tends to dethrone our · free spiritual 
center. 28 · . . 
One cannot wj_ll to be oneself without being related to 
the Power which constitutes the self, but one's free 
response is necessary if one is to be properly related to 
that Power. Perhaps it is because Nietzsche sees every-
thing in terms of what we have called the subjectively 
satisfying t hat he must see the relationship to God as a 
master-slave relationship. 29 In every description of the 
-✓ 
28
von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. JS. Cf. also Von 
Hildebrand, Liturgy and Personality, p. 55, in which he 
speaks of one's person as being essential to theocen-
trism. 
29 Just as the World can become a tool (slave) for 
my satisfaction so I would have to become a slave (tool) 
for the other's satisfaction. 
.self when it is free from despair, Kierkegaard says that 
·one wills t o be oneself. nThis then is the formula which 
describes t he condition o f the self when despair is com-
pletely eradicat e d: by relating itself to its own self 
and by willing to be itself the self is grounded trans-
parently in the Power which posi t ed it. 1130 We have seen 
that one wills to be oneself only when one is not in 
-despair and that one is grounded transparently i n the 
positing Power when one recognizes that one is an in-
dividual before God. One is grounded transparently in 
·God when one submits in •faith, dependence and trust to 
His Power .in an act of self-negation and obedience. What 
Kierkegaard means by the self's relatin g itself to its 
self will become clearer after we have looked more closely 
at the notions of transcendence and immanence in relation 
to the self. 
JOKierkegaard ; The Sickness Un t o Death, p. 147. 
Vo TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE 
This chapter will deal with the notions of immanence 
and transcendence. First we will look at definitions and 
general uses of the terms. Then we will see how these 
notions are related to the self. Von Hildebrand speaks 
of two components of personality, the natural endowment 
_and the relationship to the world of values which a person 
has. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard's ideas on the self will 
be viewed in terms of these two components. Nietzsche 
has a view of man as immanent because he sees any rela-
tionship to something beyond man as weakening to him. 
Nietzsche uses the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as 
an authority for his ethical system, replacing God, the 
origin of Christian ethics. Yet this is not a real rela-
tionship to the Transcendent. For Kierkegaard the rela-
tionship to the Transcendent confirms the individuality of 
the self and is essential to it. The self is a relation-
ship which rel .ates to itself through its relationship to 
God. 
Clarification of Terms 
We have used the terms "immanence" and "transcen-
dence" when speaking of the categories of importance and 
of the notions of power. Let us look more closely at what 
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these terms mean. 
Both terms denote a relationship. Something which 
is immanent is within something. Something which is 
transcendent is beyond something else. Such terms are 
said to be relative. When looked at from one point of 
view something might appear to be transcendent, yet when 
looked at from another point of view the same thing may 
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be considered immanent. For example we said that a drive 
is something immanent, it comes from within the person. 
-When a person is concerned with satisfying a drive he is 
~oncerned with fulfilling a need within himself. The 
means which are used to fill this need may be transcendent, 
outside the person, e.g. food, drink, companionship. Yet 
this fact does not _mean that in fulfilling a need a person 
is concerned with the transcendent, except in a very 
limited sense, of using a transcendent means or tool. 
We may speak of different kinds of transcendence. 
First let us consider immanence and transcendence in a 
me ·taphysical sense. Here we are concerned with the meta-
physical locus of an entity. In speaking of immanence 
and transcendence here we will always be speaking of two 
terms or entities • Immanence here means that one of the 
.. entities is within the other, e.g. my thoughts are imma-
·nent to me, although what they refer to is usually outside 
me. Transcendence means that one of the entities is out-
side of the other. We could say very simply that the tree . 
is transcendent t o me, it is outside of me. With regard 
to the metaphysical status of entities we can also speak 
of transcendence in terms of a hierarcy of beings • 
. Animals transcend plants, man transcends animal s and God 
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transcends man. However, the verb "transcends" here does 
not refer . to any act on the part of the entities but re-
_fers only to their metap~ y sical status. 
Next we may speak of immanence and transcendence in 
the _intentional sphere. To transcend on e self is to go 
outside oneself. Here we speak of transcendence as the 
act of an entity going outside of itself. This is always 
. . 
a personal act. It is this transcend ence which charac-
terizes the value respons e . There is no active parallel 
to "to transcend" which refers to immanence. We can 
only speak of immanence as remaining within oneself. In 
attaining that which is subjectively satisfying one may 
use a tool which is transcendent to him, but he is still 
concerned with satisfying the drive which is immanent. 
When we consider formally or metaphysically the 
means used in attaining the subjectively satisfying, and 
the values to which we respond, we can see that both are 
-transcendent. Metaphysically speaking both are outside 
of us. However, the act of satisfying a drive is charac-
terized by immanence, by remaining wi t hin ourselves, 
-whereas the value response is characteriz~d by transcen-
dence, by going beyond ourselves. The realm of v alue is 
the realm of the importan-c-in-itself. This realm is 
transcendent to any person and his subjective desires. 
In going beyond myself to a tool or means which is for-
.mal .ly transcendent to me I miss the objective reality of 
the tool, I see it only in terms of my subjective need. 
In going beyond myself to a value which is also formally 
transcendent to me I gra['p the objective importance of 
the value and gj_ve it its due response. One might say 
that one's virtue is immanent, for it is within one's 
self. Yet virtue, which comes from the right relation 
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to value is characteriz~d by transcendence. The value 
response is characterized by transcendence because that 
whi.ch motivates the response and the end for which it is 
given are transcendent. The satisfaction of a drive or 
urge is characterized by immanence because that which 
motivates the action and the end of the action are within 
the person. 
As God is the Ultimate Value so He is the Ultimately 
Transcendent. God is not just transcendent to a particu-
lar thing or person but He is infinitely transcendent to 
all that is. To transcend oneself means to rise above or 
b.eyond one's limits or powers. This transcendence is 
possible for a person only when he is related to God, the 
Ultimately Transcendent. 
50 
Two Compon ent s of Personality 
For the purpose of this paper we will look at im-
manence and transcendence in relation to becoming oneself. 
We quote Von Hildebrand: 
Two main components of personality must here be dis-
tinguished: in the first place, the fullness of the 
essential spiritual 'organ, 1 the faculty of loving and 
knowing, the power of will, the natural potential of 
the pe ~ son, the intensity of life which flows in him--
we might say his 'essential endowment,' as distinct 
from special talents; in the second place, the organic 
link with t he world of values and of truth, the per-
ception of them, the response to them, the living in 
truth, in tune with the objective logos, and the ab-
sence of all subjective deviations from the meaning 
of being. 1 
This first component of personality, the natural 
potential, is the immanent part of a person. This is of 
course very important in becoming one's self, for it does 
include one's special talents and the vitality of his 
life. However without the second component, the relation-
ship to the realm of the transcendent, one's personality 
remains incomplete. The first component of personality 
is concerned with man as spirit only in the ontological 
sense, while the second component refers to man as spirit, 
in the sense of his being consciously related to the trans-
cendent, i.e. in the sense of intentional transcendence. 
In another passage Von Hildebrand more clearly 
points out the correlations between these two components 
1von Hildebrand, Liturgy and Personality, p. 17. 
and the notions of immanence and t:ranscendence. "The 
difference between an appetite or urge (the tendency for 
example, to develop a talent, to release spiritual 
energies) and a value respon~e clearly reveals the es-
sential immanence of the first and the transcendence of 
2 
the second." The realm of the immanent is ve!'y broad, 
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including the satisfaction of drives and also the develop-
ment of talents and the growth of the ontological endow-
ments. The essential characteristics of the relationship 
to the transcendent are the characteristics of the value 
response. These are: (1) Value response has the charac-
ter of self-abandonment, of"• •• conforming of ourselves · 
to the logos of the value." Urges are not engendered by 
the object and its importance and .so are blindly immanent. 
Urges are engendered by something within the person. (2) 
" • Value response possesses a co6pletely new, in-
telligible meaningfulness; and especially as transcendence 
in an entirely new sense." The value response transcends 
the realm of the purely personal and takes one to what is 
objectively important-in-itself. (J) "Only in the value 
response do we find that such a response is objectively 
due the object. 113 From these characteristics it is clear 
2von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. 220. 
Jibid., pp. 214-218. Cf. also Von Hildebrand, 
Liturgy~ Personality, p. 47 in which he speaks of the 
theocentric man as opposed to the egocentric man who is 
incapable of the self-abandon necessary to · the value 
response. 
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that when one is concerned with what is important for the 
self, no matter how broadly, one is still within the 
realm of the immanent. 
While the relationship to the transcendent is not 
part of man's natural potential it is not an activity 
which is foreign to him. "It is indeed a deep· charac-
teristic of man to desire to be confronted with something 
beyond self~centeredness, which obligates us and affords 
us the possibility of transcending the limits of our sub-
jective inclinations, tendencies, urges, and drives rooted 
exclusively in our nature."
4 
The transcendent confronts 
us, obligates us and allows us to go beyond the limits of 
our nature. By being related to the transcendent, man 
at the same time both acknowledges his finitude by ac-
knowledging that a response is due to a greater Power, and 
also is related to the Infinite by going beyond his na-
tural potential. 
The capacity to transcend himself is one of man's 
deepest characteristics. • • Man cannot be understood 
if we interpret all his activities as manifestations of 
an automatic striving for self-perf'ection. • It is 
not an immanent movement, unconscious or conscious 
which is man's typical mark. · 
••• The nature -of the value response in no way 
requi .res indifference toward our own objective good • 
• • • Later on we shall see that the value response .and 
our deep, legitimate desire for true happiness, : far 
from being anti the tic are organically linked. 5 .· 
4
von Hildebrand, Ethics, p. J?. 
5 . 
ill.£., pp. 218-19. 
This pa ss age shows t h at b e c omi n g oneself is not just a 
striving f or self-perfection, not an immanent movement 
such as the will to power. As Kierkegaard stated, t he 
self must be rela te d to the Po wer which constitutes it; 
in order to be its t rue s e lf. Becoming th e self is n ot 
the goal of t he relationship to the consti t uti!lg Power 
l>.!:!.!. the c ons ea u enc e of this relationship; also, one is 
related to God not only as Power but as the omnipotent 
Good or Value. 
Nietzsche's View of Man as Immanent 
We have seen several times that Nietzsche is con-
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cerned with the real~s of the subjectively satisfying and 
so with the immanen t . But let us look at these ideas more 
closely for some have claimed thit Nietzsche is indeed in-
6 volved with Transcendence. Nietzsche seems to acknow-
ledge only one genuine component of personality and that 
is the natural potential which a man possesses. Nietzsche 
sees any relation to a greater Power or an objective 
---value as a weakening of the personality. 
We ,do not be .lieve that a man will become another if he ~ 
is not that other already; i.e. if he i~ not, as is 
often the case a multiplicity of persons, at least the . 
embryo of persons. In this case one can bring a _ dif-
ferent role into the foreground and dr aw .1 the f ormer j 
man' back--The aspect is changed not the · essenc~--That 
someone ceases t o perform certain actions is a mere 
fatum brutum that permits the most varj_ous interpreta- . 
6 
See below note 14. 
tions. It is not always the case that the habit of a 
certain act is broken, the ultimate reason for it 
. removed.7 
This passage clearly shows that for Nietzsche one becomes 
oneself by developing what one already in some way is. 
He would deny the Chr .istian idea of putting on the new 
man. We would agree that a change of actions does not 
necessarily indicate that one is a changed person. It is 
true that one's ontological essence or natural potential 
does not change, but for Nietzsche real change and be-
coming does not take place in the sphere of intentionality, 
in one's relation to the realm of value. This component 
of the personality which involves true becoming Nietzsche 
has denied. His only answer is that one must love one's 
fate. Because he does not acknowledge that with God all 
things are possible, he does not allow for the possibility 
of conversion and its power. 
Nietzsche insists that the Overman is not an ideal 
of a higher kind of man. One suspects that this anti-
thesis to ideals is because of the connotation of their 
being above man and requiring a certain relationship. In-
deed "higher" implies transcendence, whereas "more" or 
"intensity" do not as such imply transcendence. The move-
ment towards more power and the intensification of con-
sciousness is still an immanent movement. Perhaps he 
7Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 211. 
would ra t her d e scribe him a s the ultimat e n atural - man. 
Indeed he says, "Genius resides in instinct; goodness 
likewise~ One acts perfectly only when one acts in-
s -cinctively. 118 This passage · reitera t es t he :'i.deas that 
for Nietzsch e whate v er greatness belongs to man is im-
Jnanent and has nothing to do with man's relation s hip to 
the transcendent. 
One o :f Nietzsche I s main criticisms of Christianity 
was that it presented an ideal type of man and therefore 
,did not allow for individuality. 
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A virtuous man is a lo wer species 
a 1 person 1 but acquires his value 
pattern 01~ man that is fixed onc e 
does not possess his value apart: 
he has his e quals, he mus t no t be 
because he is not "' 
by c onforming to a L 
a nd for a J.l. He ) 
he can b e compared, . 
an in d i v idual-- 9 
Nietzsche does not see that a virtuous man conforms to 
the objective nature of the value which demands a re-
sponse, not to a pattern of man. Conforming t o a pattern 
of man implies that what is important is how men compare 
with one another, rather than the difference between man 
and God. Nietzsche denies that man b 8 comes himself only 
by being an individual before God, because he holds that 
being before God denies one's individu a lity. Being before 
God demands -obedience which in Nietzsche's mind is a 
limitation of the immanent d y n~~ism of the instincts and 
so a limitation of one's individual personality. He de-
8
Ibid., p. 2 l~J. 
p. 26 ·1. 
Cf. also Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 
9Nietzsche, The Will to Po wer , p. 176. 
sires not only to be apart from all other men but from 
God as well. 
Religion for Kierkegaard was primarily individual, 
an essentially personal matter between one soul and 
God; the principle of Christianity is the impor t ance 
of the individual, and 'with this category Christianity 
stands or falls.' His formula for becoming a Chris-
tian--inasmuch as we are not born Christians nor be-
come Christians en masse--is to relate oneself' per-
sonally, as an individual to God. 10 
Bonifazi 1 s description of Kierkegaard shows that being a 
unique individual and being related to the transcendent 
are integrally connected. A Christian is not one who 
conforms to a pattern of men but one who has a personal 
relationship to God. When we speak of the value of a 
person, of his intrinsic importance, we are stating that 
apart from his relationship to any other man, or any pur-
pose he might serve that each individual is worthy of 
respect. But this is not to say that this intrinsic im-
portance requires that man be absolutely independent. In-
deed it is because each man has the .possibility of re~ 
la .ting himself to the Power which constitutes him that he 
possesse_s value. 
When Nietzsche speaks of the virtuous man he is 
speaking of a man who is related to values in a certain 
10 Bonifazi, Christendom Attacked, p. 148. He is 
quoting Kierkegaard's, The Poin t of Vi ew, p. 136. Cf. 
also Kierkegaard, The Sickn e ss Un to Dea th, p. 16 6, in 
which he speaks of the worldly view of man always being 
concerned about the differences between man. 
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way. We have seen that the relationship to values and 
the relationship to the transcendent are closely connected 
because God, the Ultimately Transcendent, is the .Ultimate 
Value. For the Christian the relationship to God entails 
a certain relationship to values, but always one is re-
lated to God as an individual. 
'There is only One who knows what He Himself is, that 
is God; and He knows what every man in himself is, f·or 
it is precisely by being before God that every man - is.' 
This Christian view of man stands in contrast to 
Nietzsche's 'purely immanent anthropology' in which 
man himself is the creator of values: 'What is in-
jurious to me is injurious in itself. 111 
This passage shows that a view of man that does not 
recognize that man is essentially an individual before 
God; that sees man as the creator of values, and which in 
fact views value only in terms of the subjectively satis-
fying is in fact a view of man as immanent. Nietzsche's 
Overman is transcendent only in relation to the mcffi of 
men • . Eut the transcendence of the self is only present 
when one acknowledges the limits of one's finitude and 
when one - is then related to the Infinite as Transcendent. 
When man is related to the transcendent he is re-
lated to something outside of and beyond himself. It is 
this relationship to something beyond which allows a man 
to €0 beyond the limits of his self-centeredness. 
Nietzsche, however, sees any relationship to something 
11 Eonifazi, Christendom Attacked, p. 84, quoting 
Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, p. L~J, and then 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 228. 
beyond as limi t ing and we a kening. 
The n i hilistic quest i on 'for what?' is rooted in the 
old habit of supposin g th at the g o a l must be put up, 
-given, demanded fr o m outs ide by som e s up e rhum a n 
authori -ty . ... One wan t s t o g e t around _ t .l;l,e w'ill, -
the willin g of a goa l , the risk of positin i a go a l 
for on e sel f ; on e wants t o rid oneself of the respon-
sibility (on e would accept fatalism). 12 
This is a rather curious passage f or Nietzsche seems to 
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be saying that one is stronger and better if one wills a 
goal for oneself than if one accepts a goal from outside. 
Yet we ha v e seen before that when Nietzsche spoke of hj_m-
self he said that there was no willing or striving for 
.anything in him and that his formula for greatness was 
So perhaps Nietzsche's Overman is not the 
totally independent man of power which he seems to be. 
Nietzsche understood Christianity as a complete out-
look upon the world con ce ived as a whole; once 'it's 
lea~ing concept, the belief in God, is wrenched ,from 
it, the whole is destroyed; nothing vital remains j _n 
our grasp.' But if Christian moral commands are of 
transcendental ori g in, and st an d or fall wi t h belief 
in God, Nietzsche required so me authority to formulate 
his inverted canons of ethics, a _requirement met b y 
the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Our actions must 
· be worthy to be repeated eternally. lJ 
Nietzsche is correct in his understanding of Christianity 
as an outlook on the world as a whole, and in which the 
belief in God is absolutely necessary. Indeed for the 
Christian understanding the world as a whole is a conse-
l 2 N· t h ie zsc e, The Will to P ower, p. 16. 
13 Bonifazi, Christendom At tacke d, p. 115, quoting 
Nietzsche, Twilight o f t h e I do l s / An t i c hrist, p. 131. 
.59 
quence of' his faith in God. Christian moral commands are 
-0f transcendent origins. Love of one's neighbor flows 
from one's relationship as an individual to God. However, 
if it ·is then true that Nietzsche sees the need for an 
authority for his ethics, it does not follow that Nietzche 1s 
view of man is less imrnanentistic. The doctrine of the 
Eternal Recurrence is intimately connec ted with the notion 
of amor fati and so although one may want one's actions to 
be worthy of being repeated again and again, these actions 
are still motivated by the subjectively satisfying. The 
Christian cannot accept this cyclical view of life for he 
does not desire that his actions be repeated but rather 




There are some, e.g. Karl Jaspers in "Kierkegaard 
- and Nietzsche," in Existentialism from Dostoe vsk y to 
Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (Cleveland: . The World 
Publishing Co., 1956), p. 172, who d-o claim that the 
Eternal Return and Overman are transcendent in Nietzche's 
philosophy. He admits that on the surfac ·e there seems 
to be no transcendence: "If one takes the symbols of . 
Nietzsche's _ religion literally, there is no longer any 
transcendental content in their will toward immanence: 
aside from the eternal cycle of things, there is the will 
of power, the affirmation of Being, the pleasure which 
'wills deep, deep eternity. 1 " If Jaspers wants _to say 
that these things which appear immanent are actually 
transcepden t i . t seems he must be using trancendent in a 
very narrow sense. In the Eternal Return ot1e . may trans-
cend time perhaps, and the Overman may transcen~ the limits 
of_the mass of men, but he is still basically immanent 
for he acknowledges no greater Power and is totally rtio'ti- · 
vated by what is good for him, rather than responding to 
a transcendent value for its own sake. 
--~ . , 
Kierkegaard: Individua li ty and th e Re l ati on 
to the T ranscendent 
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We have already seen many times that in Kierkegaard's 
J.>.b.:Llosophy of man one becomes oneseJ.f only by being re-
lated to the Transcendent. Let us look more closely at 
how Kierkegaard views the relationship between individu-
ality and this relationship to the Transcendent, for 
Nietzsche seems to think that acknowledging anything be-
yond man weakens the individual. 
"In relation to God who is 'the origin and well 
spring of all individuality, 1 ea -ch man is solitary, ab-
solutely independent; yet whoever has the courage and 
hum{lity for this meeting with God--has individuality, he 
discovers the individual whom God has graciously permitted 
him to be, true individuality is the unique relationship 
to the Eternal. 1115 Important things to note here are 
that the relationship to God requires courage and humilit y, 
and that God is the origin of individuality. In the rela-
tionship to God one needs a certain kind of strength, 
courage, . to meet the demands of the relationship and one 
also needs hwnility to acknowledge one's own weaknesses 
and so be freed from despair. God is the source of one's 
individuality and one discovers the self which has come 
15 Bonifazi, Chris tendo m Atta cked, p. 149, quoting 
Kierkegaard, The Works of Lo v e, p . 22 0. Cf. Kierkegaard, 
The Sick ness Unto Death , p . 142 , in which he . describ~s the 
Christian heroism as ve nturing wholly to be oneself, th~ 
individual, alone before God. 
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from God. For Nietzsche t he -Ov erman wants to be the 
,creator -of his own individuality. Niet zsch e views in-
dividuality as implying th at one must be different, apart 
from all men and acknowledge no greater power, else one 
-- -- -:------- --- ----------- -~---becomes part of a mass. Kierkegaard too deplored the 
crowd and men who claimed to be Christians onJ_y because 
they belonged to a group, but he saw that the alternative, 
being an indi victual, could only come about through reJ_a-
16 
ting oneself to God and so to one's true self. 
Kierkegaard sees that it is because someone such 
-as the Overman is totally irn.manent and self-centered that 
he cannot accept the relationship to God as necessary for 
his individuality. "The narrow-mindedness o :f the natural 
man cannot welcome for itself the extraordinary which God 
has intended for him, so he is offended ••• " at t;he ac-
cusation of weakness. 17 The natural man who believes that 
all his greatness is within him waiting only to be de-
veloped cannot look beyond himself and acknowledge that 
the individuality offered by a greater Power is where his 
true greatness lies. The relationship to God is something 
out of the ordinary for each man must respond to the call 
-of the supreme value on his own, he does not achieve 
this relationship as a. matter of course, by development of 
his natural potential. 
16 cf. Spren Kierkegaard, "That Individual," in 
Existentiali sm from Dostoevsky to Sartre, pp. 92-99 ■ 
17 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 217. 
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Each man who wishes to establish a relationship to 
the Transcendent must willingly obey the call of the value 
£or a due response. Only then will he become an indivi-
dual. 
The important thing is to choose with energy and 
seriousness, for then t he personality shows its r ela-
tionship wi t h the eternal, the experience of choosing 
'imparts to a man's nature a solemnity, a quiet dig~ 
nity;' bringi n g him face to face with 'the eternal 
Power itself' it enables his personality for an eter-
nity. He becomes himself; his consciousness is 
unified, his personali t y integrated, and he is him-
self. 18 
One must choose the new direction of being related to God, 
one cannot just accept one's fate and allow one's natural 
potential to develop if one is to become oneself. It is 
obvious that the choice which is essential to becoming 
oneself is not the same as choosing what is subjectively 
satisfying. As Kierkegaard has stated, one's endeavors 
are only marked by seriousness when the self acknowledges 
a great Power which constitutes it. The relationship to 
this Power which results in the integration of on e 's per-
sonality is what Kierkegaard is speaking of when he re-
fers to the self relating itself to itself. The absolu-
±ely necessary relationship to the Transcendent Power 
,should not be lost sight of in the midst of Kierkegaard's 
extensive writing on individuality, subjectivity and 
choice. 19 
18 Bonifazi, Christen d om Attack e d, p. 117, quoting 
Kierkegaard, Either/Or, pp. 2 26 , 149, 147. 
GJ 
19 Many who have tried to claim Kierkegaard as the 
father of existentialism seem to ignore this central place 
of the Transcendent in Kierkegaard's philosophy. When 
Kierkegaard says, "truth is subjectivi ty " he is empha-
sizing t he fact that one must be related to God as a sub-
ject, an individual, and not just as a thinker. One must 
relate one Is whole being, not just one Is thought' · to God 
in orde-r to become oneself. Kierkegaard':s discussi:on of 
this point in Concludin Unscientific Post sc ript, trans. 
by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie Princeton: Prince.;. 
ton University Press, 1968), pp. 169-224, makes several 
distinctions about subjectivity, objectivity and the 
existing individual. Throughout the - discussion of inward-
ness and passion the point remains: "Essentially it .is 
the God-relationship that makes a man a ID?-:P. ••• " (p. _219) 
Kierkegaard is not speaking of subjectivity in the sense 
in which . it is often used to denote someone who has no 
relation to anything outside of himself and cho .o:ses only 
what is good for him. 
. Kierkegaard states, "Only ethical and ethico-
religious knowledge has an essential relationship to the 
existence of the knower." (p. 177) This is so because 
through such knowledge one comes to relationship to God. 
So it must follow that truth is not attained through 
objectively thinking about God but only through · the com-
mitment of the whole person as subject. Kierkegaard em-
phasizes the existing subject but always with an eye to 
the subject's relationship to God. Heals& reiterates 
here (p. 179, footnote) that one comes to this relation-
ship by going through despair to faith. 
VI. OVERMAN VS. THE I1'17)IVIDUAL BEFORE GOD . 
In this chapter we will reconsider Nietzsche's and 
Kierkegaard's views on the self. For Nietzsche a man be-
comes himsel :f not by. t ranscendence, by relating himself to 
another, b ut rather by seeking his own greatness. Egoism 
is central to Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche presents 
Overman as the creator of v alues. In this way he denies 
-~hat component of man's personality which is his relation-
~hip to the world of values. He is guilty of Satanic 
pride in desiring metaphysical lordship over the process 
of bec oming himself • 
.Kierkegaard describes the Self as a relationqhip. 
Only by being related to God in faith is a person free 
from despair and thus wholly himself. For Kierkegaard 
man does not become a self by seeking to do so. Only by 
losing oneself and seeking God, by acknowledging God as 
the Power which constitutes the self does the self become 
truly itself. 
Now that we have looked at Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 
in relation to the categories of importance, to their no-
tions of power and to the concepts of immanence and trans-
cendence we return to their notions of the self. We have 
seen that for Nietzsche his vi.sion of what man could be is 
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the Overman. Kierkeg a ard sees man's greatness as the In-
dividual who is in the right relation to God. Let us 
examine again the great differences between these two 
views of the self and how these views follow from their 
respective attitudes to power and transcendence. 
In criticizing Christianity Nietzsche states: 
••• religion is the product of a doubt concerning the 
unity of the person, an alteration of the personality: 
insofar as everything great and strong in man has been 
conceived as superhuman and external, man has belittled 
himself--he has separated the two sides of himself, one 
very paltry and weak, one very strong and astonishing, 
into two spheres and called the former 'man,' the 
latter 1 God.r1 
We see here again the themes that man doBs not acknowledge 
a transcendent value but rather posits a realm of the be-
y·ond because he does not realize hip own power. Nietzsche 
does not recognize the two · factors of personality, one I s 
natural potential and one's relation to the realm of 
values. He thinks that one must look at man from the 
point of view of developing his immanent potential and 
that any t hing beyond this self-centeredness involves the 
breaking down of the unity of personality. However, 
Kierkegaard has shown that one's personality is integrated 
only when one freely acknowledges one's metaphysical 
situation as an individual before God. This is not a 
belittling of man but rather a realistic recognition of 
one' · s limitations and fini tude, while remembering that 
1Nietzsche, The Will t o Pow er, pp. 86-87. 
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a.man has always the possibility of relating to the eternal. 
Ni -etzsche' s Overman judges the worth of all things 
by whether or not they are useful to him. More specifi-
-cally a thing has importance if it enhances his power. 
Nietzsche looks at the realm of moral laws and values 
also in this light. Consider this quote from Eonifazi: 
"Their [moral laws'] wor~h is to be judged by the degree 
·to which they promote life. Eut Life is the Will to 
Power, therefore every code of behaviour is a tool in the 
struggle for power; it is a device whereby some type of 
•man seeks to secure himself and to subordinate his 
rivals. 112 This description shows that even if Nietzsche 
were correct in stating that life is will to power he 
would still err in _judging the worth of moral laws by how 
.well they serve life, rather than seeing that they are 
important in themselves. 3 
2E . f . om . azi, Christendom Attacked, p. 108. 
3on page 84 of Christendom Attacked Bonifazi states, 
"Kierkegaard affirms and Nietzsche denies God in the in-
terest of' a more abundant life. 11 He claims they are both 
Romantics and so primarily concerned with self-fulf'illment. 
Those who look at them both only as existentialists might 
say the same thing. Bonifazi has missed the point that 
although it is true that man's relationship to God enables 
him to become himself, becoming himself is not what moti-
vates Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard affirms God not because 
He serves life or any other interest but because He is the 
Ultimate Value and he must affirm Him. If God is equated 
with Life, as is often done in Scripture then one could 
accept Bonifazi's statement without doing damage to the 
Christian viewpoint of Kierkegaard's writing. However one 
could not theri say that he was motivated by ~4e same thing 
as Nietz sc he. If Kierkegaard is motivated bj ~Life (God) 
he is in the realm of values; if Nietzsche is motivated by 
Life (will to power) he is in the realm of the subjec-
tively satisfying. 
Nietzsche does not wish to acknowledge a re .alm of 
Yalue apart from the subjectively satisfying; nor does 
he acknowledge that one become.s oneself by relating to 
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another, to a greater Power. Zarathus-tra says, "'You had 
not yet sought yourselves; and you found me. Thus do all 
believers; therefore all f'ai th amounts to so little. Now 
I bid you lose me and find yourselves, and only when~ 
4 
have all denied me will I return to you.'" Nietzsche's 
formula for becoming oneself is the opposite of Chris-
·tianity in which one loses oneself to find Christ and so 
gain his soul. 
Egoism 
For Nietzsche man is motivated by the desire to be-
come himself, for Kierkegaard man ought to be motivated 
by the desire for union with God. For Nietzsche the end 
is immanent, for Kierkegaard it is transcendent. "In con-
trast to man, the Superman is an end in himself, for ego-
ism is of . the essence of a noble soul, by which Nietzsche 
meant that 'other beings must naturally be in subjection, 
and have to sacrifice themselves' to the Superman who 
would regard this as 'something that may have its basis 
in the primary law of .things,' as I justice its elf.' 115 
4Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 220, in which he is 
quoting from Thus Spoke Zarathustra , First Part, last 
chapter. 
5Bonifazi, Christendom Attacked, p. 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 122. 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 141-42. 
147, quoting · 
Cf. also 
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.Here .we have an indication that Nie tzsche is aware of the 
power of the realm of value and that he would like to use 
this power for his own purposes rather than giving to 
values their due response. Nietzsche immanentizes the 
transcendent value. He retains some of the formal traits 
of value (e.g. its power, its demanding and calling for a 
due respons 'e from man) and applies them to the Overman who 
can now demand sacrifice of others. This is the trans-
valuation of values. Selfishness and egoism are of prime 
importance for Nietzsche for a man's greatness is in his 
instincts. For Kierkegaard the self is more than the ego 
and one must be more concerned with responding to values 
than with satisfying ego demands if one is to become one-
self. 
Nietzsche thinks that the Overman should embQdy the 
-qualities which Christianity negates and that primarily 
he must become the giver of his own values. 
What values are negated by it? ['the Christian ideal] 
What does its counterideal comprise?--Pride, pathos of 
distance, great responsibilit y , exuberance _, splendid 
animality, the instincts that delight in war and con-
quest ·, the deification of passion, of revenge, of 
cunning, of anger, of voluptuousness, of adventure, of 
knowledge--; the noble ideal is negated: the beauty, 
wisdom, power, splendor and dangerousness of the type 
'man': the min who fixes goals, the 'man of the 
future 1 • • • 
Here again we see that Nietzsche equates the nobility of 
man with the development of his immanent potential, the 
6
Ni.etzsche, The Will to Power, p. 129. 
~atiifaction of all ego-centered drives, and the fulfill-
went of his will to power. Passion, revenge, cunning and 
,anger all have the character of reflexivity rather than 
•Of transcendence. Because Nietzsche is concerned with 
the development of a powerful "type" of man, independent 
and totally resp':>nsible for his own greatness, he thinks 
that Christianity is also concerned with the development 
of a "type" of man and does not see that a Christian is 
an individual before God, who is not concerned with how 
he comp~res with other men. 
Overman 1 s Pride as the Creator of Values 
We began this paper by examining the differences 
between value and the subjectively satisfying. The ways 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard view these differences are cen-
tral to their views of man. The only way Nietzsche wants 
to be "related" to the realm of value is by creating that 
realm himself. He views this as sup _erhuman, but perhaps 
we·might call it inhuman. By denying man's metaphysical 
position of relatedness to the realm of value one is 
denying half of his personality and limiting man to the 
possibilities of his fate. Nietzsche thinks that if man 
is the creator of his own values he enhances his own power 
and greatness. "• •• He [Zarathustra] does not conceal 
the fact that his type of man, a relatively superhuman 
type, is superhuman precisely in its relation to the good 
--that . the good and the just would call his overman 
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devil. 117 If man is the creator of his own "values" he is 
•unable to transcend his 0 "\'.71 natural potential and so 
rather than being superhuman he really possesses only 
half of his true human self. Man is neither God nor 
·devil, but is an individual with lim i tations and so his 
unique possibj_lity of being related to the eternal. 
Von Hildebrand has a good description of the man 
who wants to be totally responsible for creating himself, 
the man who has a desire for "metaphysical lordship." 
The man who has fallen prey to this satanic pride is 
blind to the real nature of values, to their intrinsic 
beauty and dignity; but, unlike the concupiscent man, 
·who in his complete bluntness ignores values, he 
grasps their metaphysical power. Certainly he mis-
u,nderstands the nature of this metaphysical power, 
otherwise he could not attempt to dissociate it from 
values •••• This type of man is further characterized 
by metaphysica 8 haughtiness. He abhors all submission, all obedience. 
We have seen that this pride is charac ·teristic of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of the Overman. The Overman 
wishes to appropriate the power of values to his own pur-
poses. He feels that the free obedience which is charac-
teristic of human value response and so of the human self, 
is a sign of weakness. He chooses to "obey" and "love" 
his fate thus imprisoning himself in his own immanence 
rather than allowing for the possibility of transcendence, 
-and so of the true power of the human personality, the 
7Nietzsche, Ecce ~, p. JJ1. 
8
von Hildebrand, Ethics, pp. 442-4J. Cf. Nietzsche, 
The Will to Power, p. 1J 6 , where he speaks of "an extreme 
pride" · which is in order for man. 
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. individual before God. 
·~kegaard's Selr as a Relation 
.For Kierkegaard man becomes himself only when he is 
related to the transcendent God through faith. Each in-
dividual must make the choice be tw een faith . and despair. 
Kierkegaard's description of the self is rather compli-
cated but now that we have seen his notions of power, 
despair and transcendence we may be able to understand it 
more clearly. 
The self is a relation which relates itself to its own 
self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for 
it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; 
the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] 
that the relation r e lates itself t o its own self. Man 
is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the 
temporal and the eternal, of f reedom and necessity, in 
short it is a synthesis. A synthesi .s is a relation 
between two factor~. So regarded, man is not yet a 
self.9 
- When Kierkegaard says "the self is not the relation but 
[consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself 
to its own self" he is referring to the fact that the self 
is always in a process of becoming. The self is not just 
natural potential waiting to be developed. The fact that 
the self relates itself to itself indicates that the self 
·takes an active part in becoming itself. 
-Man has two relations to God. First there is the 
.metaphysical +elation. Man's being depends on God, whe-
9Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 146. 
Brackets are the editor's. 
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the.r he is in faith or despair he is metaphysically re~ 
lated to God by this dependence. In addition to this 
,metaphysical relation man is obliged to respond to God, 
±o relate consciously to Him. Even if this intentional 
conscious relation of obedience is absent the metaphysical 
relation is still present. When man consciously responds 
to God he relates the metaphysical relation to God and 
thus he becomes transparently grounded in God. The self's 
relation to the world of value is something active, it is 
.not just a matter of course. Here the self is integrated, 
becomes whole. 
When Von Hildebrand speaks of the two factors in 
the development of personality he is speaking of the same 
th:I .ng as Kierkegaard when he speaks of man as a synthesis 
between two factors. The temporal, the finite, the neces-
sary are part of man's natural potential. Man also has 
the possibility of relating to the eternal and the in-
finite through his free response to the demands of Value. 
As temporal man's life is seen as a ceaseless striving 
with no end or satiation in sight, but the eternal factor 
is . the eternal now of the fullness of God's presence. 
The finite part of the synthesis is the limitation of 
man's metaphysical relation to God. Man cannot break . the 
finitude on his own and become himself. This is the de-
spair of willing to become oneself without God. The in-
finite in man is present when he goes beyond his meta-
physical limits by relating consciously to God through 
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· £aith. Man's metaphysical essence is necessary but this 
.,essence can be liberated by transcending the metaphysical 
limits of the self by responding to God. Until man has 
actually made this choice to be related to the Trans-
~endent Power and so acknowledged the most essential as-
pect of his being he is not yet a self. 
If this relation which relates itself to its own self 
is consti t uted by another, the rel at ion [the self] 
doubtless is t he third term, but this relation (the 
third term) is in turn a rel at ion relating itself to 
that which consti t uted the whole r e lati .on. 
Such a derived, constituted rela t ion is the human 
self, a relation which relates itself to its own self, 
and in relating itself to its own self relates itself 
to another. 10 
The _self is not only related to itself, but primarily is 
related to the Power which constituted the relationship 
which is the self. The human self is a derived, consti-
tuted relation. This reiterates the metaphysical condi-
tion of man as the individual before God. This passage 
shows that man is not just immanently turned in upon him-
self in intentionally relating himself tc himself, but he 
is consciously related to the transcendent Power which 
constitutes him. At first it sounds like Kierkegaard is 
saying that only by being concerned with itself does the 
self relate to another, but we can see from a further 
statement that one must first acknowledge the -constitu-
ting power in order for one to become oneself. "This 
formula [i.e. that the self is constituted by another] is 
10~. 
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. the expression for the total dependence of the relation 
(_the sel.f namely), the expression for the fact that the 
self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium and 
rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that Power 
whi .ch constituted the whole relation. ·1111 
Man is completely dependent on the Power which con-
stitutes him in order to become himself. But this fact 
does not deny the free nature of man's relation to the 
realm of value. Kierkegaard points this out when speaking 
of despair. 
· No, this thing of despairing is inherent in man him-
sel.f; but if he were not a synthesis, he could not 
despair, neither could he despair if the synthesis 
were not originally from God's hand in the right rela-
ti.onship. 
Whence then comes despair? From the relation wherein 
the synthesis relates itself t o itself, in that God 
who made man a relationship lets this go as it were out 
of His hand, that is in the fact that the relati:on 
relates itself to itself. 12 
Man despairs if he does not consciously relate to God as 
he is destined to. Without God the Belf is a reflexive, 
non-transcending relation and so not a true self. If' man 
were not . a synthesis, a relation between two factors, he 
could not despair. It is the tension between knowing 
what one is and what one might become, between giving in 
to the wishes of the subjectively satisfying and respon-
ding to the demands of value, which causes one to despair. 




For Nietzsche man does n ot despair, there is no tension, 
he only allows his natural potential to develop and loves 
his fate. Because God allows man to despair, allows him 
to relate himself to himself, take part in his own be- · 
coming, man is free though he is always grounded in the 
greater constituting Power. 
This tension of despair is related to the leap of 
faith, which for Kierkegaard is the only alternative to 
despair. One cannot overcome despair by one's own ef-
.forts but one can be open to faith and believe that with 
God all things are poss~ble. 
Faith j_s a leap behind the ac t ion of which lies power 
genera t ed in the tensions of inner struggle •••• 
Bondage to finitude contrasts with the yearning for 
infinity; the insistent voice 1vhich calls for absolute 
obedience to the~Absolute assails the d emands of all 
relative moral 'f-€.) 1 ~ ; l onging for redemption strives 
against subjection o sin's power. 13 
Faith is the condition of the self when despair is gone, 
when the factors are integrated, one is whole and truly 
oneself. "This then is the formula which describes the 
condition of the self when despair is completely eradi-
cated: by relating itself to its o-wn self and by willing 
to be itself the self is grounded transparently in the 
Power which posited it.:i 14 
13Bon~faz~, Chr~st e ndom At ta cked, p. lJO. 
14Kierkegaard~ The Sickness Unto De a th, p. 147. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented two different philosophies 
of man. These philosophies were viewed in terms of the 
categories of importance, and their role in motivation. 
For Nietzsche man is motivated by his desire to attain 
what is useful to him, by his will to power. For 
Kierkegaard the real self is motivated by his desire to 
be properly related to God. 
A man is motivated by will to power because he 
feels a lack in himself and desires to fill this empti-
ness. He wishes to enhance his power, to becom .e some-
thing more, something greater than what he is. This 
desire to be greater is characterized by pride; one wants 
to be totally in control of enhancing one!s greatness. 
Yet ·will to power like all drives is insa ti3.ble, one can 
never satisfy the desire for power. As an individual one 
cannot fulfill the will to power and so one sacrif 'ices 
oneself to the greater impersonal power of fate, and amor 
fati becomes the formula 1~or human greatness, though 
paradoxically it implies human weakness. 
For Kierkegaard man is most himself when he turns 
from the realm .of the subjectively satisfying to the realm 
of value; when his goal is not immanent but transcendent; 
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and when he is no longer concerned with enhancing his o,vn 
power and is concerned with acknowledging the greater 
Power on whom he depends. In his metaphysical relation 
to God man is not yet a self. Only when he is inten-
tionally related to God in obedience and f'aith and thus 
transparently grounded in God is he truly himself. He 
has gone beyond his human limitations to the Infinite 
through his response to God. Nietzsche sees man's inten-
tional re1ation to God as a sign of weakness and so he is 
left imprisoned within the necessity of his fate, his 
metaphysical essence. 
Nietzsche's Overman is pres ented as the man of the 
future~ a superhuman goal, the epitome of t he ma.n of 
instinc t s. Kierke~aard's Individual before God, the man 
of faith, is also an ideal. Kierkegaard speaks of himself 
as being in despair rather than faith. Because it is a 
--------------, 
totally personal matter between oneself and God one cannot ·.--~--------------·--------.,.___ .,..-·· _____.., - ·-~ 
judge whether another actually has faith; indeed, it is 
-· - _. .... "" ~¥ - -----~ ___ ,,,.....-- .. ___________ .............. __ ---
difficult to determine regarding oneself. Since man is 
' --- ----·-· ---------------, 
destined and obliged to relate consciously to God it is 
' .---·-------------------. -----------··--------...._ 
'~..... ---------Kie rk e ga a rd' s ideal of faith which is truly possible for - ,,,..--- ---------------- ·- ---------......... 
man. Nietzsche's ideal of the Overman, a superhuman v L 
ideal, actually makes it impossible for a man to transcend 
the limitations of his metaphysical essence. Thus a man 
is cut off· from the Int'ini te and the Eternal a.Act remains 
"human, all-too human." 
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If man is motivated solely by will to power as 
Nietzsche claims, the self is something which is totally 
reflexive. It is always seeking to satisfy its immanent 
drives and urges and there is no relationship to anything 
.beyond. The person is totally self-centered and the con-
sequence of this is that he really has no self in the 
true sense of the word. He has only a metaphysical self. 
Nietzsche presents the Overman as the creator of 
.values and the master of himself. He does not wish to 
acknowledge the limits of man's fini tud,~ and his depen-
dence on something greater. Without limits there is no 
individuality. Nietzsche's Overman then, rather than 
being the ultimate individual, actually becomes only the 
imperscnal necessity of fate. 
( Kierkegaard is the true proponent of individuality. 
Yet this is not individuality for its own sake, nor an 
individuality which is totally independent, rather it is 
the true individuality, the true selfhood which emerges 
from a right rela tionsh:Lp to God) 
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